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Executive Summary 
 
Abstract 
The research was commissioned by the UK Department for International Development and 
the Canadian International Development Agency to explore gender-growth linkages in the 
context of mineral-rich economies. The report provides a thorough literature review of 
macroeconomic studies on gender, natural resource abundance and growth and aims at 
quantifying the dependence of growth on gendered variables, institutional proxies 
(government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law) and resource dependence indices 
with the use of statistical (econometric) analysis. The study reveals that relative female to 
male schooling (often considered a strong determinant of economic growth performance) does 
not impact significantly on economic performance, once the analysis controls for differences 
in institutions and resource dependence. While resource-dependent economies are likely to 
underinvest in female education, there is no strong evidence linking such reduced female 
schooling to feeble growth performance. 
 
Programme 
The study commenced in May 2008 and ended in September 2008. Data collection took place 
between May and August 2008, with preliminary results and data issues discussed at the 
regional DFID office and the National Bureau of Statistics in Abuja and the Nigerian Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (NISER) in Ibadan. 
 
Motivation and Objectives of the Research 
An extensive literature in development economics points to a tendency of resource-rich 
countries to underperform in terms of economic growth, a phenomenon often coined as the 
“resource curse”. In parallel, researchers and practitioners specialising in economic 
development have increasingly focused on the instrumental effects of gender bias on 
economic growth. The report aims at bringing together these two streams of development 
literature that have evolved so far independently.  
The research strategy was designed to: 
• provide an extensive literature review on the resource curse and macroeconomic 
gender-growth linkages; 
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• integrate the two separate literature streams and explore whether resource-rich 
countries suffer more from increased gender inequality (potentially due to structural 
characteristics or political economy reasons) and thereof reduced economic growth; 
• identify research gaps and future research needs; 
• critically evaluate the robustness of existing statistical analysis, and bring proxies of 
institutional quality and resource richness into perspective; 
• provide a summary of Nigeria’s macroeconomic history (economic growth, 
macroeconomic gendered data, role of mineral sector, institutions) and reflect on 
recent trends. 
 
Key Findings and Recommendations 
The study estimates cross-country growth regressions in the tradition of Klasen (2002), whose 
work has largely influenced (if not dominated) the gender-growth literature. The growth 
analysis has incorporated institutional and resource abundance variables and also focused on 
the linkages between resource dependence and gender inequality. The key findings can be 
summarised as follows: 
• Contrary to Klasen’s analysis, we find gendered education (the relative female-male 
years of schooling) to be the only consistently significant educational variable, 
enhancing growth. Gendered education, though, loses its statistical significance once 
the analysis takes into account variation in institutions (government effectiveness) and 
resource abundance. 
• Both agricultural and mineral dependent economies experience increased gendered 
inequality (even after controlling for income levels, institutions and cultural 
differences). 
• The report emphasises the fragility of statistical estimates of the role of gendered 
education on growth. While there is tentative evidence that gendered education may 
act as a resource curse channel for resource-dependent economies, institutions play a 
bigger role in enhancing economic growth. This suggests that mineral rich economies, 
such as Nigeria, may benefit much more from limiting the extent of corruption and 
concentrating on other resource curse effects (Dutch Disease, lack of diversification, 
rent-seeking, investment in “white elephant” projects), rather than treat gendered 
education as the foremost priority in economic planning. 
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1  Introduction: Mineral-rich economies, gender and growth 
 
Recent cross-country evidence suggests that resource abundance and to an even greater extent, 
mineral dependence, have been factors detrimental to long-term economic growth, a 
phenomenon often termed the ‘resource curse’ (Auty, 1994, Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 
1999a, 1999b, Leite and Weidmann, 1999, Rodriguez and Sachs, 1999, Gylfason, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b, Stevens, 2003, Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). With good governance and 
sound macroeconomic policies, exploited natural resources can become a major contributor to 
poverty alleviation and sustained GDP growth. The resource curse paradox has attracted 
increasing attention in the development policy agenda, as demonstrated by the recent 
establishment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) that aims to promote 
transparency and strengthen governance in the mineral sector (Collier 2007). 
 
At the same time, the role of unequal access to education, property rights, assets and decision-
making has received prominent attention in development research (Aghion et al., 1999 and 
Deininger and Olinto 2000, World Bank, 2006). Within this stream of work, much attention 
has been paid to the impact of gender inequality on economic development, specifically with 
reference to educational attainment (Dollar and Gatti 1999, Klasen 1999, 2002, Klasen and 
Lamanna 2003, Elson 2006). Gender inequality in education results in inefficiency by 
restricting access to schooling for talented females and thus depriving them of the opportunity 
to fully develop their potential and participate in the formal economy (Blackden et al., 2006).  
 
The aim of this report is to bring together these two streams of development literature, which 
have so far evolved independently.2 In Section 2 we provide an extensive literature review on 
the resource curse and the gender-growth literatures and discuss recent developments in the 
field. Section 3 explores whether resource-rich countries suffer from greater gender inequality 
than their resource-scarce counterparts, potentially due to structural characteristics or political 
economy reasons. We contribute to the resource curse literature by identifying a new 
transmission mechanism that links resource abundance to sluggish economic growth via 
gendered education. In multiple estimations that combine growth, resource abundance and 
gendered education variables, we find that resource-rich economies (both in agriculture and 
minerals) are likely to experience greater gender inequality which can further suppress their 
long-term growth rate. This transmission channel linking gender inequality in schooling with 
resource richness and growth has so far been neglected in the literature and relates to the 
overall tendency of resource-rich economies to under-invest in education and neglect pro-
growth institutions. To our knowledge, this is the first cross-country empirical attempt to 
evaluate gender as an intermediate channel through which resource wealth impacts on growth. 
We find this gendered mechanism significant for both the agricultural and the mineral sector, 
suggesting a ‘gendered’ resource curse for resource-based economies. Our analysis also 
contributes to the literature focusing on gendered education and growth from a wider 
 
 
2 Our analysis in this paper is generally macroeconomic in nature. We mainly discuss interlinkages between 
income growth and gender at an aggregate level, although we occasionally make reference to the microeconomic 
welfare-gender literature and relevant intrahousehold and labour market dynamics. For some microeconomic 
studies focusing explicitly on female welfare and intrahousehold division of labour, education, and assets, see 
Agarwal 1997, Becker 1985, Hallman 2000, Kabeer and Mahmud 2004, Katz 1995, Quisumbing and de la Brière 
2000 and Udry 1996.  
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perspective. So far, the work by Klasen (2002) on the beneficial impact of education and 
growth in schooling (gendered and broader) on economic growth has received prominent 
attention but very little scrutiny (if any) of methodological aspects and statistical 
specifications, for example paying attention to the acknowledged fragility of cross-country 
regressions of this type (Leamer, 1985; Levine and Renelt, 1992). We estimate growth 
regressions, replicating and augmenting Klasen’s empirical model that focuses on the impact 
of overall education, female-male relative schooling and changes in these variables on growth 
(Klasen, 2002). However, Klasen’s work ignores the role of both institutional proxies3 and 
resource abundance variables, which have received increasing attention in the growth 
literature as income growth determinants. Hence we include proxies for both institutional 
quality and resource abundance in growth estimations, and find that contrary to Klasen’s 
findings, institutions and resource abundance appear to be more important than education in 
explaining growth variation. The only educational variable that generally remains significant 
throughout our statistical analysis is the relative average years of male to female education, 
and even this loses its statistical significance once both institutional and resource abundance 
variables jointly enter as explanatory variables. In Section 4, we complement the analysis with 
a case study of Nigeria’s macroeconomic performance over the last three decades as an 
infamous example of an economy affected in recent years by the resource-curse. We provide a 
summary of Nigeria’s macroeconomic history, focusing on economic growth trends, 
macroeconomic gendered data (gendered education, literacy, employment, labour force 
participation), the role of the mineral sector, debt overhang4, composition of exports (Dutch 
disease5) and institutions. Section 5 summarises our main results and spells out policy 
recommendations. We generally find that good institutions impact positively on economic 
growth both directly and via raising female education, while resource abundance tends to 
mitigate or even cancel out such positive effects. 
 
 
3 Knowles et al. (2002) use regional dummies and ‘Catholicism and Muslim dummies, which allow for the effect 
of religion on institutional quality, including government performance’, following La Porta et al. (1999). 
4 Where the debt of a country exceeds its future capacity to pay it. 
 http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com 
5 For an explanation of Dutch disease, see section 2.11 
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 2 Literature review 
2.1 Resource rents and growth 
Since the seminal work of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995) there has been a large 
body of theoretical and empirical work investigating the so-called ‘paradox of plenty’; i.e. the 
tendency of resource-scarce economies to outperform their resource-rich counterparts in terms 
of economic growth. The first attempts to elucidate the correlation between resource wealth 
and sluggish growth rates focused on Dutch disease explanations (i.e. currency appreciation 
and declining volume of exports), the crowding-out of pro-growth industrial activities, and the 
declining prices of primary commodities relative to manufactured ones (see Prebisch 1950, 
Corden 1984, Corden and Neary 1984, Matsuyama 1992). More recently the focus has shifted 
towards political economy explanations, exploring the tendency of resource-rich countries to 
suffer from increased rent-seeking activities, corruption, bad governance, low saving rates and 
‘white elephant’-type public investment (see Leite and Weidmann 1999, Auty 2000, Baland 
and Francois 2000, Torvik 2002, Bulte et al. 2005, Robinson and Torvik 2005, Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh 2006). 
 
One of the most striking manifestations of the resource curse appears to be the disappointing 
performance of the oil cartel countries, many of which have experienced negative growth rates 
in GDP per capita over extended periods. Oil-rich Venezuela had the second highest GDP per 
capita in Latin America before the first oil boom in the 1970s, but sustained an average 
income growth rate of -0.3 per cent thereafter. Nigeria’s mediocre average growth of 0.12 per 
cent per annum over the 1970-2000 period also suggests a stagnant economy. Resource rents 
can also have a detrimental effect on regional economies within countries. Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2004b), for instance, note that Alaska is the only US state with a negative growth 
rate over the last two decades, despite its extensive oil reserves and fishing industry. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how resource abundance impedes efforts to increase per capita income and 
improve living standards. The thick grey line captures the strong negative correlation between 
the average annual growth of GDP per capita between 1970-2000 and the share of mineral 
production in GDP in 1971 for a sample of 98 countries. Data on income and mineral 
production are provided by the Penn World Tables 6.2 from the Center for International 
Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC 2008) and by the Sachs and Warner 
database at the Center for International Development (CID 2008) at Harvard University 
respectively. Most countries with a mineral production accounting for more than 20 per cent 
of their GDP experience negative rates of income growth. A 10 per cent increase in mineral 
production (the difference between Nigeria and Mali or Malawi) would decrease economic 
growth by approximately 0.6 per cent.  
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Figure 1: Resource abundance and economic growth  
Note: Country observations are represented by their 3-letter ISO acronym codes. Nigeria (NGA) depicted 
in bold. All three-letter country codes available at the webpage of the International Organization for 
Standardization: www.iso.org   
 
The resource curse hypothesis is by no means an economic law. Wright (1990) argues that the 
industrial expansion of the US at the beginning of the 20th century was supported to a large 
extent by the discovery of minerals. More recently, resource-rich Norway (the world’s second 
largest oil exporter), Iceland and Botswana experienced robust and sustained rates of 
economic growth (see Gylfason and Zoega 2001, Acemoglu et al. 2003, Lange and Wright 
2004). In the literature the contracting impact of natural resource rents on economic growth is 
generally associated with the indirect crowding-out effect of natural resources on several 
growth determinants. Resource-rich countries that manage to sustain their pro-growth 
activities (high investment rates, education, trade openness and good governance) achieve fast 
rates of income growth. Below, we provide a concise overview of leading explanations of why 
resource dependency has resulted in sluggish economic performance.  
 
2.1.1 Dutch Disease 
The negative link between trade and resource rents is often referred to as the ‘Dutch Disease’, 
originally referring to the adverse effects of natural gas discoveries in the late 1950s on Dutch 
manufacturing through the appreciation of the Dutch guilder. Resource revenues create a 
demand shock that triggers inflationary pressures and results in an overvaluation of the local 
currency (see Corden, 1984, Neary and van Wijnbergen, 1986). Increased income raises the 
prices of non-tradeable goods (which are not determined by international markets), the terms 
of trade deteriorate and the resulting loss of competitiveness reduces the level of exports 
(Fardmanesh, 1991). Since the magnitude of exports and openness are conducive to economic 
growth (Frankel and Romer 1999), resource wealth will indirectly inhibit income growth. If 
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the export sector consists mainly of manufacturing the exchange rate appreciation will lead to 
its contraction.  
 
Apart from a decrease in the volume of exports, their composition often becomes skewed 
away from manufacturing goods and towards primary goods (Corden and Neary 1982). Man-
made capital and labour shift into booming primary sectors and away from manufacturing or 
other sectors that prove to be more conducive to growth in the long run. This was the case, for 
instance, in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, both of which offered wage premiums within 
their fishing industries (Paldam 1997).   
 
The contraction of the export sector and manufacturing is a matter of concern due to the 
learning-by-doing potential it offers. Matsuyama (1992) argues that a shift of labour from 
manufacturing deprives the economy of the growth-enhancing learning-by-doing externalities 
found in the sector. Krugman (1987) claims that an increase in resource income often creates a 
loss in comparative advantage for many manufacturing industries, which may become 
permanent if resource exploitation lasts too long. Furthermore, Herberttson et al. (1999) relate 
resource revenue fluctuations to exchange rate volatility and increased risk for investors.  
 
2.1.2 Institutions 
There is an extensive literature on the beneficial role of institutions in economic development 
(see for example North 1981, 1991, Murphy et al. 1993, Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, 
Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002).  Good standards in terms of rule of law, bureaucratic efficiency, 
corruption constraints, political stability, democratic liberties and transaction transparency are 
strongly associated with economic prosperity. This implies that any negative direct effect of 
natural resources on institutions will indirectly frustrate economic growth.  
 
Many scholars have claimed that resource rents tend to erode the sound institutional base of 
the economy. Resource rents often tempt individuals to engage in rent-seeking competition 
rather than productive activities (see Krueger 1974, Tornell and Lane 1999, Baland and 
Francois 2000, Torvik 2002). This is strongly related to the nature of natural resources 
themselves, especially in the case of minerals. In most cases there is limited access to resource 
usage rights, granted to a few public or private companies or even individuals, due to the 
limited physical availability of the resources. Such sector conditions that restrain intense 
competition create excessive profits accruing to a few agents in the economy. The larger the 
amount of resource rents (or the stricter the access to them), the fiercer rent-seeking 
competition is expected to be.  
 
Resource revenues also tend to increase unlawful informal activities that generate wealth for a 
few economic actors. For instance, resource rents often induce individuals to bribe the 
administration in order to gain access to them (Leite and Weidmann 1999). In most cases, 
even in market economies, resource management is not granted through an open-access 
auction but through the intervention of public officials. 
 
Another institutional aspect of the resource curse lies in the manner in which resource rents 
are utilised in the economy. A large share (if not all) of the resource revenues remains 
property of the government. Government officials are likely to either appropriate the rents or 
utilise them to reward the electorate of their party or interest groups that favour it. For 
instance, as Auty (1994) and Ross (1999) point out, domestic firms often achieve protection 
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against international competition by means of import substitution supported by resource 
transfers. Ross (2001a, 2001b) argues that oil and mineral revenues make governments less 
accountable to society by relieving social pressure by means of increased public spending 
(which consecutively increases public satisfaction). Robinson and Torvik (2005) argue that 
rents can be channelled into ‘white elephant’ projects of low social return as a politically 
appealing way of canvassing votes. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and de Soysa (2000) also 
argue that resource abundance is harmful to political stability, and since resource wealth is 
often geographically concentrated it may trigger ethnic or regional conflict or exacerbate 
existing tensions.  
 
2.1.3 Investment 
Investment (such as in building infrastructure) is widely perceived as one of the fundamental 
elements for successful economic development (see Barro 1991, Sachs and Warner 1997). 
Levine and Renelt (1992) found in their regression analysis that investment is one of the few 
robust determinants of economic growth. At the same time, recent empirical research has 
identified the crowding-out impact of resource abundance on investment rates and 
consequently on economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995, Gylfason and Zoega 2001).  
 
Several explanations justify the negative relationship between resource abundance and 
investment. World prices for primary commodities tend to be more volatile than world prices 
for other goods, therefore an economy based on primary production will shift relatively often 
from booms to recessions, creating uncertainty for investors (see Herbertsson et al. 1999). 
Furthermore, resource abundance often leads to a contraction of the manufacturing sector, 
which is mainly responsible for the accumulation of capital goods. Often complementarities in 
investment or positive externalities in manufacturing result in a further decrease in the 
profitability and productivity of investment (Milgrom et al. 1991). Last, even if the level of 
investment in physical capital is of similar magnitude in resource-abundant and resource-
scarce regions there are differences in its quality and the efficiency of its use. Investments 
often fail to reach the productive base of the economy (Usui 1997) and resource transfers 
often provide protection to many infant manufacturing industries that subsequently fail to 
mature (Bell et al. 1984). Instead, resource-abundant governments often invest in military and 
internal security sectors or engage in prestigious and popular projects with very low rates of 
return (Ascher 1999, Robinson and Torvik 2005).  
 
2.1.4 Policy failures  
Resource-abundant countries tend to be myopic, have irrationally optimistic expectations of 
future resource revenues and accumulate foreign debt to a greater degree than resource-scarce 
countries. Manzano and Rigobon (2003), for instance, argue that the resource curse may be 
related to excessive debt accumulated using natural resources as collateral.  Educational 
policies often seem to be neglected in resource-dependent countries. This is largely due to the 
fact that the primary sector generally demands a less-skilled and educated labour force 
(Gylfason 2001a). Auty and Mikesell (1998) argue that since resource revenues often accrue 
to governments, the decision-making of their management lies in only a few hands. A limited 
number of people involved in resource management implies less accountability and control 
over the ways resource rents are utilised. 
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2.1.5 Gender inequality and growth 
Researchers and practitioners specialising in development have increasingly focused on the 
instrumental effects of gender bias on economic growth. A new literature focusing on the 
linkages between gender inequality and economic growth has been rapidly developing, 
inspired to a large extent by Klasen’s influential work (Klasen 1999, 2002). In many 
developing countries in particular, girls with innate abilities similar to those of boys are often 
deprived of formal education and hence become constrained in developing their human capital 
fully (Blackden and Bhanu 1999, Knowles et al. 2002). In a similar vein Schultz (2002) 
claims that marginal returns to education tend to be higher for individuals with little schooling 
(mainly women) and that female education is associated with positive externalities on 
children’s education. 
 
Figure 2 captures the strong association between relative female-male education (average 
years of schooling of adults) and economic growth of GDP per capita between 1970 and 2000. 
Data on education are provided by the Barro and Lee dataset at the Center for International 
Development (CID 2008) at Harvard University. As can be seen from the graph, countries 
with perfect equality in education between the sexes (value of female/male education proxy 
equal to 1) grew on average by approximately 2 per cent per year (grey line). Countries where 
female education accounts for only 50 per cent of its male equivalent experienced growth 
rates close to 0. Below, we present some of the main mechanisms that link gender equality 
with economic growth. 
 
2.1.6 Education 
The impact of gender inequality in education on economic growth is possibly the gender-
growth linkage that has attracted the most attention in the literature. Gender inequality in 
education deprives girls with innate abilities similar to those of boys of opportunities to 
develop their human capital and participate in a series of growth-supporting economic 
activities. Assuming declining marginal productivity to education, gender inequality results in 
boys less able than girls becoming educated. This subsequently lowers the average human 
capital available in the economy, results in inefficient public resources and slows down 
economic growth (Dollar and Gatti 1999, Knowles et al. 2002, Schultz 2002). Amongst these 
studies, Klasen’s econometric analysis has received prominent attention (Klasen 2002). A 
series of other cross-country studies reach similar conclusions about the beneficial impact of 
gender equality in education on growth (Benavot 1989, Dollar and Gatti 1999, Klasen and 
Lamanna 2003, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen 2004), although little emphasis is given to the 
robustness of the results and the relative importance of institutional variables, which have 
received increasing attention in the growth literature. A noticeable exception is the study by 
Morrison and Jütting (2005) which conditions the positive effect of gender inequality on the 
presence of social institutions that ensure equal opportunities both in education and in labour 
market participation. A micro-study by Assaad (2005) confirms that institutions are likely to 
rule over gendered schooling in explaining growth differences. He notes that in Egypt the 
positive impact of female education on total factor productivity crucially depends on specific 
social norms that prevent gendered discrimination at work. 
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Figure 2: Economic growth and female-male education  
Note: Country observations are represented by their 3-letter ISO acronym codes. All three-letter country 
codes available at the webpage of the International Organization for Standardization: www.iso.org 
 
As Knowles et al. (2002) state, it is also likely that male and female human capital are 
imperfect substitutes in specific production processes. If this is indeed the case, gender 
inequality in education implicitly forces educated men to perform activities more suitable for 
women. Increased female education may also create positive externalities for other family 
members. Partners of similar educational attainment may support each other’s lifelong 
learning (Baliga et al., 1999). Similarly, female education is likely to have positive external 
effects on the quantity of children and their upbringing, with educated mothers providing a 
more learning-supportive environment at home (Schultz 2002, Klasen 2002). 
 
2.1.7 Employment 
There is some tentative evidence in the literature that increased female employment leads to 
enhanced growth rates. Esteve-Volart (2004) estimates the impact of low female to male 
labour force participation for 16 Indian states and finds a strong positive effect on economic 
growth. He claims that differences in gendered employment can explain up to a third of 
income per capita disparities. Klasen and Lamanna (2003) perform a similar analysis at a 
country level and also find a positive correlation between female employment and income 
growth. Nevertheless, little attention has been given so far to either the robustness of this 
finding or causality issues. Goldin (1994) claims that it is the process of economic 
development itself that affects female employment rather than the other way round. Several 
studies indentify a U-shaped gendered Kuznets curve in which female employment decreases 
at initial levels of economic development but increases at a higher income level once the 
economy industrialises (Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos 1989, Goldin 1994).   
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 2.1.8 Wages 
The literature focusing on the impact of gender inequality in wages on economic development 
points in the opposite direction. Most studies tend to support findings that a gender wage gap 
has benefited trade expansion and hence economic growth. Seguino (1997, 2000a, 2000b) 
cites lower female wages in export-orientated industries, for instance, as creating a 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive commodities (and stimulating export-led growth) 
in many East-Asian economies. Busse and Spielmann (2006) find that a 1 per cent increase in 
the gender wage gap increases the share of labour-intensive exports in total exports by 0.3-0.4 
per cent. Similarly, Taiwan’s export growth is attributed in part to low female wages as a 
means to maintain the competitiveness of domestic industries and shield them from intense 
international competition in commodity markets and capital flight (Seguino 1997, 2000a, 
2007, Berik et al. 2000).  
 
2.1.9 Fertility 
There is strong support in the literature for findings that higher female education results in 
lower fertility rates. Educated women face a higher opportunity cost of raising children 
(Becker et al. 1990, Schultz 1994). Government intervention (e.g. in the form of establishing 
family planning centres and approving legal clauses that prohibit child labour) may accelerate 
the transition to an economy with low fertility rates (Hazan and Berdugo, 2002). Shultz (1994) 
carried out one of the first studies that tested this hypothesis empirically. He claims that an 
increase in female schooling by just one year is sufficient to decrease fertility rates by 12 per 
cent. The effect often extends beyond gender equality in education. Paul-Majumder and 
Begum (2000) provide supportive evidence indicating that on average, female workers in the 
garment industry in Bangladesh postpone both their age of marriage and the birth of their first 
child by approximately four years. 
 
Lower fertility rates successively tend to impact positively on GDP per capita growth (Bloom 
and Canning 2000, Klasen 2002). As population growth adjusts, more physical capital per 
person (enhanced capital-deepening) raises average labour productivity. Similarly, lower 
fertility lowers the family dependency burden (the number of dependent members outside 
work) and hence permits a faster accumulation of savings in the economy. 
 
2.1.10 Structural adjustment 
There has been much criticism of the side-effects of structural adjustment on social spending 
and the provision of public goods, many of which have disproportionately affected the female 
population. Structural adjustment, as promoted by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) since the mid 1980s, endorses cutbacks in fiscal deficits, stringent 
monetary policy, a downsizing of the public sector, and trade liberalisation. Structural 
adjustment reforms have many merits in terms of pursuing macroeconomic stability and 
increased efficiency with more market-oriented allocation of resources. Simultaneously, 
though, little if any attention has been paid to efficient ways of reducing public deficits 
without affecting vulnerable segments of the society and women in particular. Many 
governments have chosen to cut public expenditure directed to the poor (where women are 
disproportionately represented) rather than reduce subsidies to the urban rich population or 
close tax loopholes (World Bank 1994, López 2006).  
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In the past, several governments in developing countries (e.g. in Bolivia, Malawi, Zambia and 
Pakistan to mention a few) adopted drastic cutbacks in public expenditure and reduced trade 
protection via tariffs often prescribed by their IMF-designed Structural Adjustment Programs. 
As a result of tight fiscal policies, the provision of public basic services (education, health, 
water and electricity supply) had to be downsized with a simultaneous increase in their cost of 
supply.  The lowering or abolition of tariffs also deprived governments of public revenues and 
further exerted pressure on social spending (Rao, 2001). Rao (ibid) estimates that a $1 decline 
in trade-tax revenues results on average in a decrease of public expenditure on capital 
formation and human capital by $0.37. At the same time, governments switch from trade-
relevant tariffs to valued added taxes (VAT) on basic commodities and services to compensate 
for loss of revenues. The consequent contraction of public investment and increase in the price 
of basic commodities (food, water, electricity) affects poor households as a whole and does 
not need to be gender-specific. Nevertheless, it is usually women who are in charge of 
purchasing household basic commodities and who counterbalance price increases by 
extending their work time and effort (Grown, 2006, Peralta et al., 2006, Palmer 1995). 
Removal of state support such as public services and subsidies for inputs and credit 
marginalise poor producers, many of them women, and deprive them of access to assets 
essential to commencing production (Atthill et al. 2007). This argument is usually absent in 
the growth-gender literature, which  generally does not disaggregate welfare and income 
effects on a gender basis. 
 
2.2 Empirical analysis 
2.2.1 Economic growth, gendered education and resource abundance 
Over the last two decades there has been an expanding number of studies on growth 
econometrics, largely thanks to advancements in computer technology and the user-
friendliness of statistical software (i.e. Grier and Tullock 1989, Barro 1991, Knack and Keefer 
1995, Sachs and Warner 1995, Frankel and Romer 1999, Bils and Klenow 2000, Alesina et al. 
2003, Dollar and Kraay 2003).  The studies evaluate the importance of specific variables as 
growth determinants. Depending on the focus of the study, the statistical analyses evaluate the 
impact of a specific set of variables (e.g. investment, trade, governance) on long-term 
economic growth (usually spanning a period of at least two decades in order to avoid short-
term fluctuations).  
 
To identify the dependence of growth on natural gendered education we estimate cross-
country growth regressions in the tradition of Klasen (2002), whose work has largely 
influenced if not dominated the gender-growth literature. We include initial income per capita 
in our regressions to check for the conditional convergence hypothesis that predicts higher 
growth in response to lower starting income per capita, keeping other explanatory variables 
constant. We construct a general growth specification where economic growth depends on a 
series of growth-relevant variables. Thus per capita economic growth between 1970 and 2000 
depends on the logarithm of initial per capita income, on a set of educational variables (the 
sign of dependence is the subject of our analysis), on resource abundance and on a set of other 
explanatory variables.6
 
 
6 Appendix A lists variables and data sources used in the main analysis. 
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We estimate our general growth specification using Ordinary Least Squares, consecutively 
alternating the set of growth-explanatory variables (Tables 1 and 2). Estimating different 
specifications is crucial in checking for the robustness of statistical estimations (see Leamer 
1985; Levine and Renelt 1992; Rodriguez, 2007).  In all regressions we include initial income 
per capita in 1970 (LnY70), average investment rate between 1970 and 2000 (Investment70-
00), population growth between 1970 and 2000 (Population growth), Sachs and Warner’s 
measure of trade openness (Trade openness) and regional dummies. Data on income, 
investment and population are provided by the Penn Word Tables of the University of 
Pennsylvania (CIC, 2008). As a measure of openness we use the percentage of years during 
the period 1965-1990 in which the country is considered an open economy according to the 
Sachs and Warner (CID 2008) database. We also include in alternating order a series of 
variables that capture institutional quality and good governance (see columns (2)-(7) of Tables 
1 and 2). We include in alternating order indices of government effectiveness (Government 
effectiv), rule of law (Rule of law) and political stability (Political stability) in 1996 (the first 
year for which data are available) from the Kaufmann et al. (2007) database, an index of 
democracy in 1970 (Democracy) by Marshall and Jaggers (2002), of Ethnic fractionalisation 
by Alesina et al. (2003) and an indicator of Land-lockedness by Gallup et al (1999). We also 
include the same educational variables found in Klasen (2002), although we extend the period 
of analysis up to the year 2000. We add the average years of schooling for the whole 
population in 1970 (Schooling70) and the relative female-male average years of schooling for 
the same year (Relative schooling70). Similar to Klasen (2002) we also incorporate the rate of 
growth in overall years of education (Growth schooling), as well as the rate of growth in 
relative female-male years of schooling (Growth rel schooling). All data on education are 
provided by the Barro-Lee dataset (CID 2008). As is now supported in many studies (Rodrik 
et al., 2004, Kahn 2005), we find that institutions rule over geography, trade openness and 
other relevant variables in explaining variation in growth rates. Good institutions (government 
effectiveness, political stability, rule of law and ethnic fractionalisation that protect property 
rights and enhance government performance) strongly increase economic growth. Similarly, 
ethnic fractionalisation, widely associated with internal strife and conflict, negatively impacts 
on long-term growth rates. Initial income is strongly and negatively correlated with income 
growth, suggesting that poorer countries grow faster once other implicit characteristics 
(institutions, education) are taken into account. Contrary to Klasen (2002) and other studies in 
the literature (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001) we do not find that investment, trade openness 
and population growth strongly affect economic development, at least not consistently.7 Even 
more importantly for this study, we find the relative female-male years of schooling (Relative 
schooling70) to be the only consistently significant educational variable. Gendered education 
appears to be significant for economic growth and dominates over other educational proxies. 
The effect is also of substantial magnitude. An increase of the share of female to male 
education from 30 per cent (as in Sudan and Zaire) to 50 per cent (as in Cameroon and 
Turkey) would result in an increase in economic growth of approximately 0.20x2.28=0.45 
percentage points per year (see Column 1 of Table 1).  
 
 
 
7 Dollar and Kraay (2003) find that the statistical significance of trade openness on growth and income levels 
varies depending on the specification used. Hoeffler (2001) claims that the investment coefficient suffers from 
similar statistical fragility. 
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 Table 1: Growth regressions (1) 
Dependent variable: Growth1970-2000 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant    12.27   12.19    9.52   10.65 
LnY70  
 
  –1.52***
        (0.33) 
  –1.49*** 
         (0.33) 
  –1.23*** 
         (0.35) 
  –1.39*** 
         (0.40) 
Investment70-00 
 
   0.03 
 (0.03) 
   0.04 
  (0.03) 
   0.06 
  (0.04) 
   0.06 
  (0.04) 
Population growth 
 
  –0.10 
 (0.13) 
  –0.09 
  (0.14) 
  –0.07 
  (0.16) 
  –0.16 
  (0.14) 
Trade openness 
 
   0.52 
 (0.61) 
    0.45 
  (0.63) 
   1.29** 
  (0.57) 
   1.10** 
  (0.56) 
Schooling70 
 
  –0.13 
  (0.11) 
   –0.17 
  (0.11) 
    0.03 
  (0.10) 
   –0.03 
   (0.11) 
Relative schooling70 
 
   2.28** 
  (1.10) 
    2.29* 
  (1.33) 
    2.28* 
  (1.36) 
    2.63** 
   (1.35) 
Growth schooling 
  
  –0.12* 
  (0.07) 
  –0.04 
  (0.08) 
   –0.02 
   (0.09) 
Growth rel school 
  
    0.03 
  (0.06) 
    0.08 
  (0.06) 
     0.09 
   (0.06) 
Government effectiv 
 
   1.21***
        (0.37) 
    1.25*** 
  (0.36)        
Ethnic fractionalis 
     
   –1.53** 
   (0.69)   
Democracy 
         
    0.03 
   (0.03) 
Sub-Saharan Afr 
 
  –1.27* 
  (0.67) 
   –1.30* 
   (0.68) 
   –0.90 
   (0.75) 
   –1.65** 
   (0.75) 
South Asia 
 
   0.69 
  (0.63) 
    0.94* 
   (0.53) 
    1.02* 
   (0.60) 
    0.19 
   (0.74) 
Latin America 
 
   0.03 
  (0.48) 
   –0.02 
   (0.48) 
   –0.54 
   (0.53) 
   –0.89 
   (0.55) 
East Asia 
 
   1.26** 
  (0.52) 
    0.94* 
   (0.53) 
     0.67 
   (0.77) 
     0.44 
   (0.77) 
R2 adjusted  0.63     0.62     0.55     0.53 
N 87    87 83 83 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1 
per cent level of significance. 
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Table 2: Growth regressions (2) 
Dependent variable: Growth1970-2000 (5) (6) (7)
Constant     9.59    9.13    12.83 
LnY70    –1.31***         (0.32) 
  –1.13*** 
        (0.31) 
  –1.45*** 
         (0.30) 
Investment70-00    0.05   (0.03) 
   0.03 
  (0.03) 
   0.03 
  (0.03) 
Population growth   –0.17   (0.15) 
  –0.10 
  (0.16) 
  –0.12 
  (0.14) 
Trade openness    1.34**   (0.60) 
   0.83 
  (0.57) 
   0.20 
  (0.55) 
Schooling70     0.01    (0.10) 
   –0.07 
   (0.10) 
   –0.23** 
   (0.11) 
Relative schooling70     3.01**    (1.51) 
    2.59* 
   (1.42) 
    1.84* 
   (1.11) 
Growth schooling       0.01    (0.10) 
   –0.11 
   (0.08) 
   –0.13 
   (0.08) 
Growth rel school       0.11    (0.07) 
    0.11 
   (0.07) 
    0.07 
   (0.06) 
Landlockdeness    –0.05    (0.37)     
Political stability       0.53**    (0.23)   
Rule of law         1.43***    (0.37) 
Sub-Saharan Afr 
 
   –1.58** 
   (0.78) 
   –1.67** 
   (0.76) 
   –1.47** 
   (0.67) 
South Asia     0.60    (0.64) 
    1.23* 
   (0.64) 
    0.19 
   (0.62) 
Latin America   –0.83    (0.54) 
  –0.88* 
   (0.54) 
   –0.20 
   (0.49) 
East Asia      1.10*     (0.62) 
    1.31** 
    (0.63) 
     1.24** 
    (0.56) 
R2 adjusted       0.55      0.58       0.65 
N 87 87 87 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1 
per cent level of significance. 
  
 
At a second stage (Table 3) we estimate the main growth specification incorporating the share 
of mineral and agricultural production in GDP in 1971 respectively (Mineral production and 
Agricultural production). Data on natural resources are provided by the Sachs and Warner 
database at the Center for International Development (CID 2008). We use government 
effectiveness as an institutional proxy, although results can be replicated by adopting other 
institutional measures instead (e.g. rule of law, political stability). The mineral abundance 
proxies are strongly and negatively correlated with economic growth as predicted by the 
resource curse hypothesis. The relative female-male schooling variable now becomes 
insignificant, capturing a potential strong correlation with the resource abundance variables, 
which is the focus of our section 3. Resource abundance rules over gendered education as a 
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growth determinant, capturing the underinvestment of resource-rich economies in female 
education possibly because of the presence of male-dominated economic structure or the 
negligence of public institutions. 
 
Table 3:  Growth regressions (3) 
Dependent variable: Growth1970-2000 (8) (9)
Constant      8.09    18.71 
LnY70    –0.91***          (0.32) 
  –1.83*** 
         (0.35) 
Investment70-00    0.03   (0.02) 
         –0.01 
   (0.03) 
Population growth   –0.09   (0.16) 
  –0.24 
   (0.15) 
Trade openness    0.62   (0.65) 
   0.66 
   (0.59) 
Schooling70   –0.18   (0.11) 
   –0.11 
   (0.10) 
Relative schooling70    1.96   (1.36) 
    0.67 
   (1.10) 
Growth schooling   –0.12   (0.07) 
   –0.02 
   (0.07) 
Growth rel school    0.01   (0.06) 
  –0.06 
   (0.05) 
Government effective    0.65**   (0.31) 
    0.69** 
   (0.31) 
Natural capital     
Mineral production    –3.82***    (1.36)     
Agricultural production      –8.78***    (2.96) 
Sub-Saharan Afr    –0.80    (0.73) 
   –0.75 
   (0.62) 
South Asia     1.02*    (0.62) 
     0.67* 
   (0.36) 
Latin America    –0.24    (0.50) 
   –0.34 
   (0.42) 
East Asia     1.58***     (0.60) 
     1.20** 
    (0.47) 
R2 adjusted             0.60             0.66 
N 79 77 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1 
per cent level of significance. 
 
2.2.2 Natural resources and gendered education 
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have focused on the contracting impact of 
natural resources on a number of growth-relevant variables such as the rate of investment, 
trade openness, and institutions (see Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004, Bulte et al. 2005, Sachs and 
Warner 2005). No attention has been paid so far to any possible negative impact of resource 
dependence on gender variables as an indirect mechanism affecting long-term growth. To our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to examine any possible crowding-out effects of resource 
abundance on gendered variables and gendered education in particular. If resource abundance 
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indeed reduces gendered education and gendered education promotes growth, as suggested by 
Tables 1 and 2, this would suggest an indirect transmission mechanism relating natural 
resources to economic growth via a negative effect on female schooling.  
 
First, however, we estimate a specification that relates gender inequality in education with a 
number of gender-relevant variables. Following the recent study by Neumayer and de Soysa 
(2007), we augment the Klasen-type specification to include the effects of democratic 
institutions (Democracy), initial income (LnY70), the share of Muslims in total population 
(Muslim), and geographic proxies on gender inequality. Data on the decomposition of the 
religions of populations by country are provided by La Porta et al. (1999).8 Following their 
findings, we expect countries of higher income per capita, better institutional quality and 
lower representation of Muslims in population to pursue more actively pro-female policies. 
Next, we add the resource abundance proxies in our general specifications (mineral production 
and agricultural production), since the potential correlation between resource intensity and 
gendered outcomes is a focal point of the study. Empirical results are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Natural resources and gender  
Dependent variable:  
Relative 
Schooling70 
(10) 
Relative Schooling7
99 (11)
Relative 
Schooling70 
(12) 
Relative Schooling70 9- 9 
(13)
Constant  0.35 0.35 1.77 1.59 
LnY70  0.05 (0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
–0.07 
(0.05) 
Mineral production –0.35** (0.16) 
–0.22* 
(0.14)   
Agricultural prod   –1.29*** (0.41) 
–1.19*** 
(0.31) 
Democracy   0.01*** (0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Muslim –0.24*** (0.09) 
–0.19*** 
(0.07) 
–0.31*** 
(0.07) 
–0.23*** 
(0.05) 
Sub-Saharan Afr 0.05 (0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
South Asia –0.23* (0.13) 
–0.21* 
(0.11) 
–0.24** 
(0.10) 
–0.20** 
(0.08) 
Latin America 0.13** (0.06) 
0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
  0.06* 
(0.04) 
East Asia –0.02 (0.07) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
–0.14 
(0.09) 
–0.06 
(0.06) 
R2 adjusted 0.58 0.59 0.66 0.73 
N  79 79 76 76 
Note: robust standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 1 
per cent levels of significance 
 
We find higher income levels and better institutions to be positively correlated with female-
male education ratios as expected. Evidence also suggests that nations with large Muslim 
 
 
8 We also added the share of Catholics in total population as an explanatory variable, but it remains statistically 
insignificant throughout all regressions. 
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populations experience greater incidences of gender inequality in education. The share of 
mineral production in GDP is strongly and negatively correlated with our gendered education 
proxy, suggesting that there is strong evidence for a gendered resource-curse channel. 
Mineral-rich countries appear to suffer from lower female than male education and the effect 
can be of considerable magnitude. A difference of 10 per cent in the share of mineral 
production in GDP is associated with a drop in female years of schooling of 3.5 per cent 
compared to the male equivalent (column 10 of Table 4). Since differences in mineral 
dependence between resource-scarce and resource-rich economies are of even greater 
magnitude, the effect on gendered education is further amplified. 
 
In column 11 of Table 4 we use the average female-male ratio of years of schooling for the 
1970-1999 period as the dependent variable and confirm that our main findings still hold. It 
appears that mineral abundance had a long-term effect on gendered education (other studies 
have also confirmed a long-term impact of resource abundance proxies on growth-relevant 
variables such as institutions, investment and trade (see Sachs and Warner 1995, Papyrakis 
and Gerlagh 2003). In columns 12 and 13 we use agricultural production in GDP as an 
alternative measure of resource abundance. Again, we find a strong and negative statistical 
association between agricultural production and gendered education. Countries with an 
extensive primary sector (minerals, agriculture) suffer from increased gender inequality in 
education, an effect that holds after controlling for other socio-economic characteristics 
(initial GDP per capita, institutions, religious composition). 
2.3 The case of Nigeria 
Nigeria, despite being one of the world’s major oil exporters (with crude oil production 
exceeding 2 million barrels per day in 2006), has experienced a rather disappointing economic 
performance over the last four decades with minimal improvements in living standards and 
extensive macroeconomic instability. Several factors (amongst which gender inequality, 
widespread corruption, political instability, underinvestment, lack of diversification, Dutch 
disease adjustments) have jointly resulted in poor growth performance. In this section we 
provide a summary of Nigeria’s macroeconomic history and explore how the country’s 
performance conforms to the overall resource curse experience of mineral-rich economies. We 
pay particular attention to the country’s overall macroeconomic management, institutions and 
gender dimensions.  
 
Since 2000, economic performance has drastically improved. The economy is currently 
growing at approximately 6 per cent per year, but this is likely to be partly attributed to the 
recent surge in oil prices, as well as to the recent economic reforms pursued by the Obasanol 
administration. Unless economic fundamentals and overall macroeconomic management 
improve drastically the current growth rate will prove to be unsustainable in the long run, 
especially if oil prices adjust downwards.  
 
2.3.1 Gross domestic product 
Income growth over the last four decades has been erratic, with frequent alternating booms 
and slumps. Overreliance on the mineral sector created a see-saw effect for GDP per capita 
growth in line with oil price volatility (see Iyoba and Oriakhi 2008). Real income per capita 
grew between 1960 and 2006 by less than 1 per cent per year. Even this modest rate is largely 
attributed to the recent soaring oil prices. Between 1960 and 2000 the average annual growth 
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rate in GDP per capita amounted to a mediocre 0.50 per cent.  As indicated in Table 5, the 
economy expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s following the exploitation of new oil 
reserves and the beneficial impact of the two oil crises on oil prices.9 Nevertheless, as 
comparing the difference between the rates of change in GDP and GDP per capita makes 
obvious, rapid population growth (in excess of 2 per cent for most of the period) eroded a 
large proportion of such growth benefits to the average worker. Throughout the whole period 
incidences of fast growth in GDP per capita, exceeding 2 per cent, were largely adjustments to 
previous recessions or falling oil prices rather than any representation of a general trend. 
Following a prolonged period of contracting output between 1980 and 1984, the Babangida 
administration introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 in an effort to 
liberalise trade flows and modernise the financial system (Iyoba and Oriakhi 2008). There is 
little evidence that the SAP was either successfully implemented or that the real economy 
benefited from it. Since 2003 there has been a reversal of fortune, largely supported by soaring 
oil prices. Prudent spending and improvements in economic fundamentals (investment rates, 
diversification, education) are much needed in order to avoid a short-lived increase in 
economic growth similar to that of the 1970s. 
 
Table 5: Economic growth 
Year GDP growth (%GDP per capita 
growth (%) 
Year GDP growth 
(%) 
GDP per capita  
growth (%) 
1961 0.19 -2.09 1984 -4.82 -7.39 
1962 4.10 1.71 1985 9.70 6.67 
1963 8.58 6.07 1986 2.51 -0.39 
1964 4.95 2.51 1987 -0.70 -3.56 
1965 4.88 2.43 1988 9.90 6.71 
1966 -4.25 -6.51 1989 7.20 4.08 
1967 -15.74 -17.75 1990 8.20 5.07 
1968 -1.25 -3.62 1991 4.76 1.75 
1969 24.20 21.19 1992 2.92 -0.02 
1970 25.01 21.97 1993 2.20 -0.69 
1971 14.24 11.46 1994 0.10 -2.71 
1972 3.36 0.83 1995 2.50 -0.34 
1973 5.39 2.76 1996 4.30 1.44 
1974 11.16 8.26 1997 2.70 -0.08 
1975 -5.23 -7.82 1998 1.88 -0.84 
1976 9.04 5.90 1999 1.10 -1.56 
1977 6.02 2.86 2000 5.40 2.67 
1978 -5.76 -8.62 2001 3.10 0.47 
1979 6.76 3.57 2002 1.55 -1.00 
1980 4.20 1.19 2003 10.69 7.96 
1981 -13.13 -15.55 2004 6.00 3.43 
1982 -0.23 -2.94 2005 7.20 4.66 
1983 -5.29 -7.83 2006 5.20 2.75 
Source: World Bank (2008): World Bank Development Indicators 2008 
 
 
 
Looking beyond income, Nigeria also appears to have made little progress in broader human 
development (Table 6, Graph 1). Between 1975 and 2005 its UN Human Development Index 
(HDI), capturing progress in income per capita as well as education and life expectancy, only 
9 The late 1960s negative growth rates are attributed to the Nigerian civil war. 
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improved from 0.321 to 0.470, little faster than in neighbouring West African countries. The 
largest increase took place between 1975 and 1980, but this possibly captures the fact that 
initial increases in welfare are easier to achieve. Nigeria still lags behind many resource-scarce 
neighbouring economies (i.e. Cameroon, Ghana, Togo). Indonesia, often compared to Nigeria 
as a counter-example of successful resource-based development (Bevan et al. 1999), achieved 
much higher growth in human development for the same period, arriving at medium human 
development status (with its HDI index rising from 0.471 to 0.728). 
 
Table 6: Human Development Index 
Year HDI index HDI % change HDI CameroonHDI Ghana HDI Togo HDI Benin 
1975 0.321  0.422 0.442 0.423 0.312 
1980 0.378 17.76 0.468 0.471 0.473 0.344 
1985 0.391 3.44 0.523 0.486 0.469 0.367 
1990 0.411 5.12 0.529 0.517 0.496 0.374 
1995 0.432 5.11 0.513 0.542 0.514 0.403 
2000 0.445 3.01 0.525 0.568 0.521 0.424 
2005 0.470 5.62 0.532 0.553 0.512 0.437 
Source: United Nations (2008): Human Development Report 2007/2008 
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Graph 1: Human Development Index of Nigeria and neighbouring West African countries 
 
2.3.2 Economic fundamentals 
Sound economic fundamentals (high investment rates, good institutions, diversified economic 
structures) are vital elements of sustained economic growth. An influx of resource rents often 
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induces myopic macroeconomic planning and discourages the formation of a growth-
inductive environment. As Table 7 indicates, Nigeria has traditionally invested rather a low 
share of its GDP, often falling below 10 per cent in the early 1980s. Since investment is 
largely associated with the building of new infrastructure supporting the productive capacity 
of the economy, low rates of investment jeopardise sustained long-term economic growth. On 
a rather more positive tone it has to be acknowledged that the liberalisation of credit markets, 
the establishment of new banks and the privatisation of public enterprises following the 1986 
SAP boosted domestic investment. Nevertheless, the share of investment in GDP reached its 
peak in 1998, and despite the current influx of petrodollars and increased public revenues 
investment is no longer on the rise. Although under-investment is rather endemic in Sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole (largely explained by the low availability of domestic savings and 
high investment risk), much-faster growing South Asian and Southeast Asian economies tend 
to experience investment rates well above 30 per cent (with China and India approximately to 
45 and 35 per cent respectively).  
 
Table 7: Investment rate 
Year Investment  (% of GDP) Year 
Investment  
(% of GDP) 
1961 11.73 1984 9.53 
1962 10.54 1985 8.97 
1963 11.18 1986 15.03 
1964 13.31 1987 15.98 
1965 15.39 1988 18.01 
1966 13.89 1989 17.73 
1967 13.66 1990 14.74 
1968 12.37 1991 23.43 
1969 12.19 1992 21.80 
1970 14.82 1993 23.29 
1971 18.72 1994 19.64 
1972 21.09 1995 16.34 
1973 22.41 1996 14.17 
1974 16.97 1997 17.45 
1975 25.23 1998 24.11 
1976 31.48 1999 23.38 
1977 28.33 2000 20.26 
1978 27.53 2001 24.09 
1979 22.08 2002 26.23 
1980 21.25 2003 23.86 
1981 23.28 2004 22.36 
1982 20.00 2005 20.86 
1983 14.74   
Source: World Bank (2008): World Bank Development Indicators 2008 
 
Over-reliance on oil left Nigeria vulnerable to external economic shocks and price 
fluctuations. Since the emergence of the mineral sector in the 1960s, oil has increasingly 
become the driving force of the Nigerian economy. According to Dutch disease theory, 
increased demand, supported by the influx of resource rents, boosts relative wages in the non-
traded sectors and the booming resource-dependent industry, while the rest of the economy 
shrinks, due both to the relocation of labour and to appreciation of the local currency. Nigeria 
has been no exception to this rule of thumb. As Table 8 and Graph 2 illustrate, the shares of 
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the agriculture and oil sectors in GDP were almost equal at the beginning of the 1980s after 
the second oil shock. Although the relative importance of sectors largely depends on relative 
prices (and hence on external conditions), its neglect of agricultural policies has transformed 
Nigeria to a net importer of the agricultural commodities it traditionally produced (i.e. rice and 
maize). Even more importantly, manufacturing’s relative share shrunk from 10 per cent of 
GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to a mediocre 2.3 per cent in 2006 with no signs of 
immediate recovery. Although agricultural production has increased in recent years in an 
attempt to diversify the economy, soaring oil prices have kept the relative share of the oil 
sector in GDP at very high levels (close to 38 per cent in 2006). As a result, Nigeria is likely 
to remain a largely resource-driven economy and hence prone to resource-curse development 
failures, at least in the short-term. 
 
Table 8: GDP decomposition 
Year Agriculture 
(% of GDP) 
Manufacturing  
(% of GDP) 
Oil  
(% of GDP) 
1981 21.18 9.42 21.46 
1982 22.98 9.72 17.35 
1983 24.23 10.23 13.91 
1984 28.38 8.00 15.16 
1985 29.05 8.90 16.75 
1986 29.56 8.82 13.82 
1987 29.66 6.65 25.40 
1988 35.00 7.47 21.47 
1989 26.10 5.26 35.30 
1990 25.57 5.18 37.46 
1991 25.63 5.86 37.33 
1992 22.67 4.79 46.34 
1993 28.68 5.44 35.40 
1994 33.00 6.78 24.35 
1995 27.28 5.27 39.65 
1996 26.41 4.75 42.84 
1997 28.83 4.98 38.15 
1998 32.94 5.09 27.20 
1999 29.69 4.58 32.07 
2000 21.83 3.52 47.72 
2001 28.31 3.85 35.32 
2002 44.13 3.18 26.02 
2003 38.59 3.14 32.30 
2004 30.48 2.82 37.22 
2005 29.02 2.57 38.87 
2006 28.50 2.31 37.61 
Source: Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (2007):  Nigeria, National Accounts 
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Graph 2: Fuels, non-fuel minerals, agriculture, manufactured exports and other sectors as 
shares of GDP (%) 
 
Table 9 presents a similar picture for the decomposition of exports. Exports were much more 
skewed towards agriculture at the beginning of the 1960s, but by the early 1970s oil was 
already accounting for more than 50 per cent of the volume of exports.10 Ever since then there 
has been a persistent dominance of oil in exports which has been independent of oil price 
fluctuations. Oil currently accounts for 98 per cent of all exports and the current level of oil 
prices is most likely prone to reinforce the current trend. The share of agricultural 
commodities in exports has been negligible in recent years, although there has been a slight 
increase in manufacturing. Nevertheless, unless investment deliberately targets non-oil 
activities it is very unlikely that any drastic changes in sectoral composition can be expected. 
 
 
 
10 Any remaining share, not attributed to minerals, agriculture and manufacturing, belongs to food exports and 
services.   
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 Table 9: Exports decomposition (% of total exports) 
Year Fuels Non-fuel  Minerals Agriculture 
Manufactured 
exports 
1962 10.30 1.09 16.63 5.56 
1963 10.99 5.74 17.88 1.09 
1964 13.41 7.01 15.69 1.17 
1965 25.88 6.52 10.92 1.12 
1966 33.42 6.44 10.58 1.27 
1967 30.84 6.17 9.15 1.27 
1968 18.21 7.00 8.61 2.82 
1969 42.72 4.71 6.92 1.51 
1970 58.15 4.20 5.11 0.72 
1971 74.47 2.18 2.74 0.52 
1972 83.00 1.48 1.56 0.64 
1973 83.82 0.79 2.22 0.50 
1974 92.96 0.53 1.01 0.27 
1975 93.24 0.46 0.58 0.23 
1976 94.23 0.29 0.36 0.27 
1977 93.00 0.28 0.38 0.21 
1978 90.14 0.34 0.38 0.31 
1979 94.87 0.19 0.47 0.46 
1980 .. .. .. .. 
1981 97.06 0.15 0.12 0.13 
1982 .. .. .. .. 
1983 94.41 0.12 0.08 0.03 
1984 95.15 0.14 0.05 0.02 
1985 96.72 0.05 0.04 0.04 
1986 93.11 0.03 0.41 0.02 
1987 95.37 0.07 0.52 0.44 
1988 .. .. .. .. 
1989 .. .. .. .. 
1990 .. .. .. .. 
1991 96.63 0.02 0.56 0.70 
1992 .. .. .. .. 
1993 .. .. .. .. 
1994 .. .. .. .. 
1995 .. .. .. .. 
1996 95.58 0.01 1.62 1.11 
1997 96.28 0.01 0.08 3.36 
1998 96.98 0.00 0.10 2.47 
1999 98.94 0 0.13 0.60 
2000 99.64 0.01 0.01 0.21 
2001 99.66 0.01 0.01 0.31 
2002 94.04 0.03 0.28 5.01 
2003 97.90 0 0.01 2.07 
Source: World Bank (2008): World Bank Development Indicators 2008 
 
A front that Nigeria has achieved considerable progress in recent years appears to be its debt 
management. As Table 10 illustrates, at the beginning of the 1970s Nigeria’s debt (external, 
public) amounted to a single-digit share of GDP. As often happens with resource-rich 
economies, the Nigerian government resorted to overspending and excessive borrowing while 
the price of primary commodities remained high (Manzano and Rigobon 2003). When natural 
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resource prices adjust downwards the adjustment is usually painful. Following the crash in oil 
prices in the mid 1980s external debt accounted for more than 100 per cent of Nigeria’s GDP. 
However, since the early 1990s debt has been steadily declining, leaving spaces for valuable 
resources to be allocated to investment rather than loan repayments. 
 
Table 10: Debt 
Year External debt  
(% of GDP) 
Public debt  
(% of GDP) 
1970 6.67 3.60 
1971 10.46 5.92 
1972 8.81 5.27 
1973 11.73 7.37 
1974 7.57 4.75 
1975 6.07 3.79 
1976 3.68 2.21 
1977 8.73 2.37 
1978 13.94 6.32 
1979 13.21 6.88 
1980 13.90 6.65 
1981 19.06 9.42 
1982 24.06 16.32 
1983 50.25 32.05 
1984 63.06 37.70 
1985 65.63 43.06 
1986 109.90 88.72 
1987 123.80 114.76 
1988 129.64 120.52 
1989 126.33 122.68 
1990 117.45 110.79 
1991 122.75 118.35 
1992 88.72 80.95 
1993 143.94 123.73 
1994 139.85 118.14 
1995 121.28 100.11 
1996 88.97 72.04 
1997 78.54 62.47 
1998 94.24 72.94 
1999 83.76 64.29 
2000 68.19 65.28 
2001 64.67 60.87 
2002 65.24 60.07 
2003 59.53 53.78 
2004 52.58 45.30 
2005 22.41 20.56 
Source: World Bank (2008): World Bank Development Indicators 2008 
 
Probably the most important challenge Nigeria will face in the years to come in its effort to 
achieve robust and sustained economic growth will be the control of endemic corruption and 
an increase in transparency. Although there has been criticism of the inefficient management 
of resource rents, the corrupt malpractices of governing regimes was a much bigger problem 
in the past. Former rulers directed resource revenues into private accounts abroad and widely 
tolerated if not rewarded extensive rent-seeking and bribery (Iyoba and Oriakhi 2008, 
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Kwakwa et al. 2008). Following the death of General Sani Abacha in 1998, billions of dollars, 
speculated to have originated from the oil sector, were found deposited in Swiss and other 
foreign accounts. Table 11 provides data on variables that capture corruption constraints. The 
Corruption Perception Index and Corruption Control Index range between 0-10 and -3 and 3 
respectively, with higher values indicating higher transparency.  Nigeria appears to have made 
little progress in combating fraud, and corruption is still embedded in everyday life in the 
form of bribery and rent-seeking. Although corruption again appears to be endemic in most 
Sub-Saharan economies (see also Table 11 for neighbouring Ghana and Cameroon), it is 
likely to have more pervasive effects in economies with concentrated sectors such as Nigeria, 
with its dominant oil industry. Nigeria’s commitment to implementing the newly-launched 
EITI (aimed at making petroleum revenues and contracts more transparent) may slowly 
reverse the current trend and is certainly a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, corruption 
also largely relates to how public revenues are utilised, and hence further institutional 
constraints and controls will need to be implemented. 
 
Table 11: Corruption 
Year 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
Corruption 
control  (CC) CPI Ghana CPI Cameroon 
1980-1985 1   4.6 
1988-1992 0.6   3.4 
1996 0.7 -1.25  2.5 
1997 1.8    
1998 1.9 -1.12 3.3 1.4 
1999 1.6  3.3 1.5 
2000 1.2 -1.14 3.5 2 
2001 1  3.4 2 
2002 1.6 -1.37 3.9 2.2 
2003 1.4 -1.24 3.3 1.8 
2004 1.6 -1.32 3.6 2.1 
2005 1.9 -1.23 3.5 2.2 
2006 2.2 -1.29 3.3 2.3 
2007 2.2  3.7 2.4 
Source: Transparency International (2008) and Kaufmann et al. (2007) 
 
Until recently little attention has been given to female empowerment and gender equality as a 
means to promote economic opportunities and broader development. As Table 12 and Graph 3 
illustrate, female education has been largely neglected in recent years with a ratio of girls to 
boys in primary and secondary education close to 75 per cent in 1990. Only in very recent 
years have there been drastic improvements in equalising opportunities for both sexes. At the 
same time, there has been increasing representation of women in parliament, but a mediocre 
share of 7.7 per cent share in 2007 demonstrates that women are still largely under-
represented in policy-making. There has also been a rather stagnant share of women in the 
overall labour force (close to 35 per cent). The share needs to be interpreted with caution due 
to problems with the measurement of informal activities.  
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 Table 12: Gender 
Year Ratio of Girls to Boys: 
Primary Education (%) 
Ratio of Girls to Boys:
Secondary Education 
(%) 
Parliamentary 
Seats held by 
Women (%) 
Female Labour For
(% of Total Labour 
Force) 
1990 76 75 1.0 36.20 
2000 78 81 3.1 35.47 
2001 78 81 3.1 35.17 
2002 79 80 3.1 35.15 
2003 79 78 5.8 35.16 
2004 81 78 5.8 34.84 
2005 81 90 5.8 34.70 
2006   5.8  
2007 93.6 97.6 7.7  
Source: National Planning Commission (2007): 2006 MDG Nigeria Report and World Bank (2008): World Bank 
Development Indicators 
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Graph 3: Measures of gender inequality in Nigeria by year (% female) 
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3 Conclusions 
Many countries in the developing world possess large amounts of resource wealth, yet they 
continue to suffer from extensive poverty. Current soaring mineral prices have temporarily 
secured high rates of GDP growth for most of them. Nevertheless, without improvement in the 
economic fundamentals that underpin long-term growth, current growth rates are not likely to 
be sustainable. Resource-dependent countries are generally characterised by underinvestment, 
low levels of human capital, corruption, overvalued currencies and technological stagnation, 
which can be termed the resource curse (Gylfason 2001a, Gylfason 2001b, Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh 2007). In this report we emphasise the role of gender inequality as a contributory 
explanation behind the resource curse, a mechanism rather overlooked in the literature. We 
found resource-rich countries to suffer more from gender inequality than their resource-scarce 
counterparts, which we tentatively attribute to structural characteristics of their economies or 
political economy reasons.  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first cross-country empirical attempt to link gender inequality 
and resource rents as a potential resource curse mechanism. In our empirical analysis we find 
that economies rich in minerals and other natural resources experience enhanced gender 
inequality in education, which appears to suppress long-term growth. Government budgets in 
resource-rich economies need to put greater emphasis on social spending for the female 
population. A combined scheme of increasing female schooling, access to assets and social 
services, broader employment opportunities and participation in policy making will be 
compatible with the current Millennium Development Goals and ensure that women can fully 
develop their productivity potential and participate in economic activities. The EITI initiative, 
announced at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, 
currently aims to strengthen governance and transparency in the mineral sectors of developing 
economies. Although it largely focuses on the full disclosure of oil, gas and mineral 
companies’ payments and government revenues rather than the spending side of resource 
revenues per se, the participation of multiple stakeholders (civil society groups, the private 
sector, media, parliament representatives) can exert pressure on governments for gender-
equitable social spending. Gender groups should have an active role to play in the EITI 
process and their involvement should hence be widely encouraged. If women were to receive 
greater access to social spending via a resource-based government budget this would also 
facilitate economic diversification away from mineral activities, with women participating 
mainly in labour-intensive manufacturing and services. 
 
Many of the extractive projects in developing countries are funded to a large extent by 
multinational development banks and international organisations such as the World Bank and 
the IMF. This implies that there is great potential for external pressure on how local 
governments utilise their resource rents. Lending agencies should press for resource revenues 
not to accrue to a few individuals such as politicians or members of the local elites or to 
accommodate the needs of specific societal layers, ethnic or religious groups and geographic 
areas. For this purpose, loans for extractive projects should be provided in the form of 
conditional aid. International lenders should fund projects in countries where governments 
agree in advance to an independent monitoring of the resource rents and ways to spend them. 
It is essential to specify beforehand the way in which resource rents will be utilised to 
alleviate poverty, improve welfare levels and benefit vulnerable women. In this respect most 
of the resource rents should reach the largest base of the society in terms of gender-equitable 
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investments in education, health projects, infrastructure, rural development and environmental 
programmes dealing with the negative externalities of extraction. 
 
The establishment of stabilisation funds that insulate the economy from resource shocks and 
adverse resource price trends would also shield the economy from resource-curse effects 
(Stiglitz 2005). Resource revenues are deposited in such funds (such as the Norwegian 
Petroleum Fund, established in 1990) and subsequently invested abroad. Usually, the interest 
earned on the resource assets re-enters the local economy while most of the resource revenues 
remain in the fund. In addition, such funds help to smooth consumption over time by allowing 
governments to channel more resources into the economy in periods of recession. In this way, 
resource rents are not misused by governments for either political or individual purposes. The 
disadvantage of this solution is that it often faces adamant opposition from governments in 
developing countries (as it deprives them of opportunities to seize public revenues or increase 
public consumption), and it also does not address the issue of limited provision of public 
goods for the female population. Alternatively, as a means of insulating the local economy 
from abrupt resource shocks, governments should use resource rents to repay accumulated 
public debt. This policy is particularly relevant for resource-rich countries, which in general 
use their resource base as collateral to facilitate their foreign borrowing. Again, though, debt 
management and fiscal discipline may impose a painful downward adjustment of social 
spending, affecting particularly vulnerable women. Successful debt management, therefore, 
cannot take place in isolation without careful consideration of the potential side-effects for the 
provision of public goods. 
 
Nigeria has made progress in recent years in increasing social expenditure on women, 
although there are still large disparities across northern and southern states. It has also 
drastically reduced its public debt with the help of increased public revenues from high oil 
prices. Corruption, though, still appears to be a major obstacle for sustainable economic 
development. Initiatives to increase transparency in the public and private sectors, enhance 
women’s participation in policy making and raise investment rates are all major challenges the 
country needs to face. Even more importantly, Nigeria needs to control the relative importance 
of the mineral sector in the local economy. Such a policy does not necessarily focus on 
discouraging the development of mineral projects but rather on encouraging projects in other 
sectors, possibly with the support of the resource rents. If such diversification with expanding 
activities in labour-intensive manufacturing, agriculture and services has a gender-promoting 
element embedded, the beneficial effects on economic development are likely to be further 
enhanced. 
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Appendix A: List of variables used in main analysis 
Growth70-00 
Average annual growth in GDP per capita between 1970 and 2000, 
G=(ln(Y2000/Y1970)/30)x100 per cent. Data on GDP per capita data from the Center fo
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC 2008). 
LnY70 The logarithm of real GSP per capita in 1970 (2000 US Dollar Prices).  Source: Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC 2008) 
Investment70-00 Average gross domestic investment, private and public, as a share of GDP. Source: Centfor International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC 2008). 
Population growth Annual growth rate in population between 1970 and 2000. Source: Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CIC 2008). 
Trade openness 
The fraction of years from 1965 to 1990 in which the country is rated as an open economy 
according to the criteria imposed by Sachs and Warner. Source: Sachs and Warner dataset. Cent
for International Development a  Harvard University (CID 2008).t
Schooling70 Average years of schooling amongst adults (age 15 and older) in 1970. Source: Barro anLee dataset. Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Relative schooling70 
Average years of schooling amongst female adults (age 15 and older) in 1970 divided by
its male equivalent. Source: Barro and Lee dataset. Center for International Developmen
at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Relative Schooling70-9
Average years of schooling amongst female adults (age 15 and older) between 1970-199
divided by its male equivalent. Source: Barro and Lee dataset. Center for International 
Development at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Growth schooling 
Growth in the average years of schooling amongst adults (age 15 and older) between 19
and 1999. Source: Barro and Lee dataset. Center for International Development at 
Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Growth rel school 
Growth in the average years of schooling amongst female adults (age 15 and older) 
between 1970 and 1999 divided by its male equivalent. Source: Barro and Lee dataset. 
Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Government effectiv 
Index of government effectiveness in 1996 by Kaufmann et al. (2007), measuring the 
competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery. Measure rangi
from -3 (least effective) to 3 (most effective). 
Ethnic fractionalis 
Index of ethnic fractionalisation by Alesina et al. (2003). Measure ranging 
from 0 (least fractionalised) to 1(extremely fractionalised) based on racial or linguistic 
characteristics (most data for mid 90s). 
Democracy Political regime measure ranging from -10 (institutionalised autocracy) to 10 (institutionalised democracy). Data by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). 
Sub-Saharan Afr, South
Asia,Latin America, Ea
Asia 
Regional dummies. Data by Gallup et al. 1999. 
Landlockdness A dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is landlocked country, and 0 Otherwise. Data by Gallup et al. 1999. 
Political stability 
Index of political stability in 1996 by Kaufmann et al. (2007), measuring the likelihood of
violent threats to, or changes in, government. Measure ranging from -3 (least stable) to 3
(most stable). 
Rule of law 
Rule of law index in 1996 by Kaufmann et al. (2007), measuring the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Measure ranging from -3 (least stable) to 3 (most stable). 
Mineral production Value of mineral production in GDP in 1971. Source: Sachs and Warner dataset. Centerfor International Development at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Agricultural production Value of agricultural production in GDP in 1971. Source: Sachs and Warner dataset. Center for International Development at Harvard University (CID 2008). 
Muslim Share of Muslims in total population (most data for 1990s). Source: La Porta et al. 1999
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Appendix B: Klasen’s work and inconsistencies 
Previous empirical work focusing on the role of gender inequality in education on economic 
growth, mainly by Klasen (2002) and Klasen and Lamanna (2003), has suffered from various 
inconsistencies and weaknesses in terms of the data used and the robustness of estimates. Such 
inconsistencies should be highlighted so that the average reader treats the corresponding 
empirical results with caution. Since these inconsistencies are generally not acknowledged in 
the literature, we aim with this appendix to expose some of the most important deficiencies of 
previous econometric work in the field. 
 
Part of the criticism arises from the list of variables and dataset used in Klasen (2002) and 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003). For their main growth specification, Klasen (2002) and Klasen 
and Francesca (2003) use as explanatory variables the following set of regressors: initial 
income (LNINC60), population growth (Popgro), growth in the labour force (LFG), the value 
of exports and imports in GDP (OPEN), the rate of investment (Inv), the average years of 
schooling for men at the beginning of the period (ED60), growth in the same measure (GED), 
the ratio of female to male years of schooling at the beginning of the period (RED60) and the 
ratio of the growth in female to male schooling (RGED). Additionally, Klasen (2002) and 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003) make use of a set of geographic dummy variables: Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and OECD countries (OECD). In 
Table 13, column 14, we present results for the main specification as they appear in Klasen 
(2002) explaining variation in economic growth over the 1960-1992 period. In column 14 we 
present the corresponding results for the 1960-2000 period as they appear in Klasen and 
Francesca (2003). The specifications correspond to the ones found in Klasen (2002) and 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003). It is not obvious why growth in the labor force is used as an 
independent variable along with population growth, when the two are largely correlated for 
the majority of countries. Apart from multicollinearity issues, the intuition behind using 
growth in labour force to explain GDP per capita growth (rather than overall GDP growth) is 
lacking. Data on labour force size are provided by the Women’s Indicators and Statistics 
compiled by the United Nations Children’s Fund and cover different periods of time for 
individual countries. Data are also provided for a limited number of countries (120). In terms 
of educational proxies, it is not obvious why male education is used as a proxy for average 
education (an upper-bound estimate), especially when in some countries female schooling 
years exceed their male equivalent (see Figure 2). Even more problematic appears to be the 
RGED variable, capturing the ratio of growth in female and male education. While higher 
values of the ratio may be driven by large increases in female schooling (claimed to be pro-
growth), the values may also be largely influenced by the feeble growth rates in male 
schooling in countries where most of the male population was already educated in 1960. The 
dummy variables used to capture geographic influences are also uncommon in growth 
econometrics. Eastern European and Central Asian countries are expected to be largely 
heterogeneous in terms of cultural and socioeconomic characteristics. Last, given the large 
emphasis given on institutional quality (i.e. property rights, rule of law, protection against 
expropriation risk, transparency) as one of the major determinants of long-term growth 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002, Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, North 1981, 1991 and 
Murphy et al. 1993), it is surprising that institutional proxies are absent from the empirical 
framework in Klasen (2002) and Klasen and Lamanna (2003). As we commented earlier, the 
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inclusion of institutional and resource proxies is likely to influence the statistical significance 
and size of other coefficients. 
 
Table 13: Growth regressions  
Dependent variable: 
Growth in GDP per capita 
(14) Gr1960-1992  
(Klasen 2001) 
(15) Gr1960-2000  
(Klasen and Lamanna 2003) 
(16) Gr1960-1992 
 (own calculations) 
Constant  6.33 7.35 7.37 
LNINC60 –1.13*** (-5.0) 
–2.27*** 
(-4.54) 
–1.16*** 
(-2.86) 
Popgro –0.55* (–1.4) 
–2.80*** 
(–5.27)  
LFG 0.62*  (1.5) 
  2.33*** 
(5.01)  
OPEN 0.007** (1.9) 
–0.001 
(–0.20)  
Inv 0.056** (1.7) 
  0.06*** 
 (2.93)  
ED60   0.19** (2.3) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.47*** 
(3.64) 
GED 12.61*** (3.8) 
10.42*** 
(2.39) 
3.23 
(1.05) 
RED60 0.90* (1.3) 
0.68 
(0.81) 
2.36** 
(2.24) 
RGED   0.69*** (3.0) 
  0.70*** 
(2.43)  
ECA – 0.77 (–0.9) 
– 0.10 
(–0.15)  
LAC –1.31** (–1.8) 
–0.87* 
(–1.55)  
MENA –0.15 (–0.2) 
–0.17 
(–0.33)  
SA –0.46 (–0.7) 
–0.07 
(–0.12)  
SSA –1.42** (–2.1) 
–0.83* 
(–1.44)  
OECD 0.49 (0.7) 
0.47 
(0.78)  
R2 adjusted 0.61 0.76 0.27 
N 109 93 95 
Note: t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 
1 per cent level of significance. 
 
Another statistical inconsistency lies in the fragility of empirical estimations. This becomes 
apparent when we contrast Columns 14 and 15 of Table 13, which refer to the same growth 
specification estimated for 1960-1992 and 1960-2000, as appearing in Klasen (2002) and 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003) respectively. In the extended period 1960-2000 in column 15, 
trade openness (OPEN) has the wrong sign and remains insignificant, which largely contrasts 
findings for the earlier period. Even more importantly, the level of education (ED60) and ratio 
of female to male schooling (RED60) also appear to be insignificant for the extended period 
(Column 15), with no discussion on the change in statistical significance. It is also unclear 
why the sample size drops from 109 to 93 countries for the extended period 1960-2000, when 
data availability is normally a problem for earlier rather than later periods. In Column 16, we 
estimate a similar specification to that of Klasen (2001) focusing only on initial income and 
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the educational variables (once we include Klasen’s (2001) labour force growth variable the 
sample size drops significantly). Consistently with our earlier results, we find relative female-
male education to be significant along with the level of initial male schooling in 1960.  
 
Appendix C: Panel regressions 
In Table 4 we perform panel data analysis with four observations per country (1960s, 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s). We adopt a similar growth specification to Table 3, with growth intervals 
of 10 years. LnY, Schooling, Relative Schooling, and Democracy refer to the same variables 
used in previous analysis at the beginning of each decade. Similarly, Growth, Investment, 
Population Growth, Growth Schooling, and Growth rel school are now decade averages for 
previously-used variables. Agriculture and Minerals capture the share of agricultural 
production and mineral exports in GDP at the beginning of the decade. Data on mineral 
exports and agricultural production are provided by the World Bank Development Indicators 
(World Bank (2008)). Ethnic fractionalis and Trade Openness represent the exact same 
variables used in Tables 1-4. The variables 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 are dummy variables 
capturing variation across decades. We estimate the regressions using random effects, with 
our results confirming the overall importance of relative female-male schooling in explaining 
growth variation. In regression (20), similar to our previous findings, relative schooling 
becomes insignificant when entered jointly with our measure of mineral abundance (while 
agriculture appears to play a minor role). Similar to Klasen (2002) and Klasen and Lamanna 
(2003), we also find the level of general education at the beginning of the decade to be 
insignificant. Any comparison of results between Tables 1-2, and Table 14, below, has to be 
conducted with caution, since the growth intervals are of different length (30 and 10 years 
respectively).  
 
Table 14: Panel regressions 
Dependent variable: Growth (17)  (18) (19)  (20)  
Constant    13.40   11.37    14.30   12.33 
LnY    –1.66***        (0.30) 
  –1.65*** 
         (0.33) 
  –1.77*** 
        (0.37) 
  –1.45*** 
  (0.35) 
Investment    0.05***   (0.02) 
   0.04*** 
  (0.02) 
   0.05*** 
  (0.02) 
  0.07*** 
 (0.02) 
Population growth   –0.11   (0.15) 
  –0.19 
  (0.15) 
  –0.33* 
  (0.20) 
  –0.39* 
 (0.20) 
Trade openness    1.45***   (0.46) 
 1.53*** 
  (0.53) 
   1.30*** 
  (0.53) 
  0.82* 
 (0.47) 
Schooling    0.11    (0.10) 
   0.11 
   (0.11) 
    0.12 
   (0.12) 
   0.11 
   (0.11) 
Relative schooling     2.54***    (0.83) 
    2.96*** 
   (0.94) 
    2.70*** 
   (1.02) 
    1.19 
   (1.03) 
Growth schooling    0.01***    (0.003) 
    0.01*** 
   (0.003) 
   0.01*** 
   (0.003) 
    0.01** 
   (0.006) 
Growth rel school     0.004    (0.009) 
    -0.006 
   (0.006) 
    0.001 
   (0.01) 
    0.02 
   (0.02) 
Ethnic fractionalis    –2.13***    (0.73)   
   –2.01*** 
   (0.81) 
   –0.70 
   (0.83) 
Democracy        0.01    (0.02)       
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Agriculture      –1.13    (1.80)   
Minerals          –1.78***    (0.59) 
Sub-Saharan Afr    –1.52***    (0.60) 
   –2.36*** 
   (0.62) 
   –1.24* 
   (0.67) 
   –2.06** 
   (0.68) 
South Asia     –0.20    (0.75) 
    –0.45 
   (0.88) 
    –0.01 
   (0.80) 
    0.04 
   (0.81) 
Latin America     –0.74*    (0.47) 
    –1.10** 
   (0.55) 
   –0.44 
   (0.56) 
   –0.49 
   (0.49) 
East Asia      1.06*     (0.60) 
     1.24** 
    (0.61) 
     1.11* 
    (0.64) 
     0.97* 
    (0.59) 
1960  -dropped-      1.44***    (0.37) 
    0.52*** 
   (0.56) 
 -dropped- 
 
1970     –0.18    (0.31) 
   1.18*** 
   (0.27) 
     0.52 
   (0.34) 
 -dropped- 
  
1980     –1.33***    (0.33) 
    -dropped- 
  
          –0.64*** 
   (0.26) 
        –0.88*** 
   (0.27) 
1990      –0.34     (0.35) 
    0.88*** 
    (0.26) 
    -dropped- 
  
    0.02 
    (0.29) 
R2 adjusted 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.49 
N  289 287 211 186 
Note: t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Superscripts *, **, *** correspond to a 10, 5, and 
1 per cent level of significance. 
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